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ABSTRACT 
Supply contracts amongst suppliers and buyers can be used as powerful 
mechanisms to manage trade-offs between risks and costs in negotiations 
amid the constituent parts of the supply chain. In decentralized decision-
making, as a trade transaction between a wholesaler and a retailer, social 
preferences can influence behavior of these decision makers. The objective 
of this study was to verify the effect of social preferences on transactions in 
supply chains, using Brazilian individuals with the purpose of comparing the 
results with those obtained in other countries. The methodology proposed 
in this study was quantitative, as variables already studied by previous 
studies were investigated. An experiment was conducted with three 
handlings (normal, status and relationship) simulating buying and selling 
situations in a supply chain. The results indicated that highlighting the 
performance status of a supply chain improves the efficiency of the chain 
when compared to normal transactions, or when there is a relationship 
between the links. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of supply chains according to Chopra and Meindl (2003) is to boost 
the value generated by this chain, which, according to the authors, means the 
difference between the value of the final product delivered to the customer and the 
effort employed by the chain to serve it. 
For superior performance to be achieved, supply chain constituencies must 
work together and coordinate to pursue an overall goal aligned with the objectives of 
each link (CACHON, 2003). 
Transactions in supply chains between suppliers and buyers can be carried out 
by a single decision maker who has all the necessary information, which refers to a 
centralized or integrated supply chain. Another way is when there are multiple decision 
makers with diverse incentives and information, which is the decentralized supply 
chain. 
For coordination, contracts are used in supply chains, with the objective to 
optimize chain performance. Contracts also allow the risk arising from supply chain 
uncertainty to be shared between the parties (HÖHN, 2010). 
Social objectives, such as justice, status and reciprocity, are social preferences 
sought by decision-makers in supply chain contracts (LEE; SEO; SIEMSEN, 2018). 
These social preferences influence trades in supply chain transactions (LOCH; WU, 
2008). 
In studies carried out abroad on supply contracts (LOCH; WU, 2008), it was 
found that social preferences affect decision-making in negotiations of decentralized 
supply chains, influencing the individual behavior of decision-makers. In this way, this 
study aims to investigate the effect of social preferences on supply chain transactions 
in Brazilian individuals and to compare them with studies conducted abroad, verifying 
whether there is a difference in the amplitude of the bias. 
Initially, a review of the literature on behavioral operations, an approach on 
contracts and coordination in supply chains and social preferences, and transactions 
in supply chains was carried out. 
The present work is organized in seven parts: introduction, where the objective 
of the study is mapped out; theoretical reference; methodology used and 
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characteristics of the sample; analysis and discussion of results; the final 
considerations, limitations and suggestions for future work; 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Behavioral operations, procurement and supply chain coordination, and social 
preferences and supply chain transactions will be addressed in this section. 
2.1. Behavioral operations 
Behavioral Operations is a sub-area of Production and Operations 
Management that has gained prominence abroad, however, in Brazil, it is still absent 
from studies (DA SILVA, 2015). 
This investigative area makes it possible to understand the relationship 
between the field of operations and people, and how this interface impacts operational 
performance in organizations (SILVA, 2015). 
According to the research by articles published in six renowned journals on the 
subject behavioral operations carried out by Bendoly, Donohue and Schultz (2006), 
there has been a record of publications since 1985. 
The influence of behavioral issues in relation to economic activities has been 
researched in many fields of study, such as marketing, accounting, management and 
economics, however, in Operations Management, research is still scarce (BENDOLY; 
DONOHUE; SCHULTZ, 2006). 
A study carried out by Da Silva (2015) proposes suggestions of potential areas 
of production management and operations where behavioral analysis can be applied, 
based on previous studies. 
Ribbink and Grimm's (2014) study came to the conclusion that, as is often the 
case in day-to-day supply chain operations, cultural differences also have a significant 
impact on negotiations. 
The article elaborated by Silva (2015) pointed out that there is a strong 
tendency on studies regarding decision making, where biases and heuristics make 
decisions subject to errors, and that there are cognitive factors, such as the social and 
individual understanding involved. It also states that motivation may be the reason for 
numerous operational problems, because people are motivated for various reasons. 
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The field of study of behavioral operations has advanced in three levels: 
individual, group and organizational, having relation between them. Therefore, 
managers must take into account behavioral factors so that the best decisions are 
made, discovering reasons for possible errors in the process and acting effectively in 
operational practices. 
Several aspects of behavioral operation such as social behavior, relationships, 
rewards, interaction, emotions, and motivation are similar to the issues raised in 
human relations theory. Although it is a developing area of study, the behavioral 
operations field addresses a questioning about the mechanistic view that exists in 
operations management. In this way, the differential consists in admitting that human 
behavior must be aggregated in processes and decisions, since all actions practiced 
in organizations are subject to it (SILVA, 2015). 
Based on an article by Lee, Seo and Siemsen (2018), which analyzed 
experimental studies in the context of behavioral laboratory operations from 2006 to 
2016, the three most researched experiments in operations were the newsvendor 
model, the auction and supply chain contracts. The newsvendor model can be found 
in a nationwide study by Ota and Da Silva (2017), in which the authors replicated the 
experiment conducted by Bolton and Katok (2008) and Feng, Keller and Zheng (2011), 
with the purpose of comparing their results with those obtained in surveys conducted 
abroad. 
Thus, this study addresses the experiment of supply chain contracts. 
2.2. Supply chain contracts and coordination 
According to Simchi-Levi, Kaminky and Simchi-Levi (2010), in a common 
supply chain with two negotiators; a supplier and a buyer, the following order of events 
follows: the buyer, based on a demand forecast, decides the quantity of products that 
will optimize profit and makes the request to the supplier, who reacts to the order made 
by the buyer. In this way, this order of events represents a decision-making process 
in sequence, and thus, this chain is called a sequential supply chain, where each 
subject establishes his actions, regardless of the effects of his decisions in other parts. 
The authors say that this tactic does not benefit all members in the chain, so it is not 
effective. 
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Optimum supply chain performance can be achieved if organizations work 
together in a coordinated way, although this does not always happen because of the 
concern of the members in optimizing their own goals, resulting in inferior 
performance. In order to achieve the best performance, it is necessary for companies 
to work in a coordinated way, aligning the objectives of each chain link with the overall 
desired goal (CACHON, 2003). 
Supply chain coordination, according to Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo (2004), 
can be achieved by adopting a centralized or decentralized decision-making process. 
The first case occurs when there is only one decision-maker in the supply chain, who 
has all the information necessary and important for the decision-making process and 
also the power to implement these decisions; however, in this case, there is the 
hypothesis that this control is not realistic. According to Höhn (2010), decentralized 
control occurs when there are several independent decision-makers deciding at 
different stages of the supply chain, with different information and incentives. 
Currently, decentralized chains are a majority, as a result of outsourcing and 
globalization. The production sector, when outsourced, automatically distributes 
decision-making powers among various subjects. 
Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo (2002) affirm that contracts in the supply chain 
operated in decentralized decision-making are a tool to achieve coordination and to 
obtain coherent behaviors of decision-making subjects in a decentralized environment, 
as if the chain were being operated centrally, and another important objective is to 
optimize system performance (HÖHN, 2010). 
Likewise, Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi (2010) reiterate the use of 
supply contracts as important mechanisms to achieve global optimization and better 
management of trade-offs between risk and cost and also likely benefits. 
The study presents several types of contracts, which differ based on the clauses 
that are celebrated between suppliers and buyers, which include how risks arising from 
uncertainty are shared between the parties in the supply chain (HÖHN, 2010). 
A type of contract that seeks coordination in the supply chain is called 
wholesale-price, which, according to Cachon (2003), occurs when the supplier 
charges the retailer for a unit purchased at a fixed price. According to the author, the 
wholesale price contract is not normally considered a co-ordination contract because 
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the supplier prefers a higher value in the price of its products, but this type of contract 
is often observed in the practice. 
Another type of contract is buyback, where the vendor charges the retailer a 
value per unit bought at a fixed price, but returns the retailer a portion of the value per 
unit not sold at the end. 
In the revenue-sharing contract, the vendor charges the retailer a value per unit 
purchased, and the retailer gives the vendor a percentage of their revenue. 
The contract of quantity-flexibility, according to Cachon (2003), operates as 
follows: the supplier charges a fixed value for units purchased; however, it reinstates 
the retailer for the units that were not sold. In this way, this type of contract offers 
complete protection to the retailer, while the buyback contract does so in a partial way. 
In the sales-rebate contract, the author states that the supplier charges a fixed 
value per unit purchased; on the other hand, grants the retailer a discount for each 
unit sold that exceeds a limit x, in order to encourage the effort to increase demand. 
Finally, there is the quantity-discount contract, which, according to Cachon 
(2003), is a type of contract where the supplier grants the retailer a discount in the 
purchase of larger quantities. Coordination per unit purchased; while granting the 
retailer a discount for each unit sold that is obtained when the marginal revenue and 
marginal cost curves are in the ideal quantity. 
According to their research, Cachon (2003) concluded that coordination in 
supply chains can be obtained by different types of contract. According to each 
organization, there is a form of contract that can suit your needs. 
On the other hand, Katok and Wu (2009) based on their experiment with some 
types of contract, pointed out that the efficiency obtained was lower than the theory 
predicts. 
2.3. Social preferences and supply chain transactions 
Current research on hiring, according to Lee, Seo and Siemsen (2018), points 
out that decision-makers seek to achieve reciprocity, justice, and status, which are 
social goals, as well as economic factors. These social preferences, according to Loch 
and Wu (2008), influence supply chain negotiations. 
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According to Rabin (1993), in contemporary economics it is inferred that 
subjects strive to achieve their own material advantages. But there was one exception 
to this kind of behavior that attracted the attention of economics studies: people who 
care about the well-being of the other, as well as their own well-being. However, this 
altruism, according to psychology, is more complicated, because it is not a continuous 
behavior, the subjects help when they are helped and are cruel with the people who 
hurt them, thus pointing out a concern of the subjects with justice. In his study, the 
author also noticed a possible reciprocity between the participants of the game. 
The approach based on the Game Theory proposes to study problems where 
decision making occurs between individuals, in a situation of interaction, in which the 
decision of one affects and is affected by the other party (VASCONCELLOS, 2011). 
The study of Loch and Wu (2008) was elaborated creating a sequential game 
where two players (player A and player B) choose a price. The two sums together 
determine the market price of a product (p = pA + pB). Player B determines its value 
from player A. The demand for this product is determined by the linear function of the 
price of that product q = 16-p. 
If the cost of the product is zero, the profit of the first player in one round is given 
by πA = pA (16-pA-pB), and the second player's profit is πB = pB (16-pA-pB). 
In the experiment made by Loch and Wu (2008), they randomly selected 
participants that played for 15 rounds. 
At the end of the game, for a perfect balance, player A should choose p*A=8 
and player B's preference should be p*B=4, where player A's profit would be π*A=32 
and player B's profit would be π*B=16, which would result in an efficiency of 75%. 
In the experiment conducted by Loch and Wu (2008), three conducts were 
studied: control, relationship and status. Each round of the game, the prices and profits 
of the two participants were displayed on each player's screen. In the control 
treatment, the players were chosen randomly and anonymously, and participated in 
the game without having any type of communication. In the relationship treatment, 
before starting the game, the participants stood face to face, introduced themselves 
and shook hands. Finally, in the treatment of status, at the end of each round the 
winner was announced that surpassed his opponent in the profits. 
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According to hypothesis 1 raised by Loch and Wu (2008), the decisions of the 
values of the two players would be smaller in the treatment of relationship and greater 
in the treatment of status, in relation to the treatment of control. On the other hand, in 
hypothesis 2, player A's value decision could increase based on the value decision 
determined by player B in the previous round (by reciprocity), or player A's value may 
decrease if his pay in the previous period is greater (by status), and the same condition 
applies to player B. 
The results of the experiment indicated that the social preferences modify the 
behavior and that, between the conducts there are significant differences. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
In order to reach the objectives proposed by this study, whose variables have 
already been studied previously, the applied sample was non-probabilistic and for 
convenience. Students from graduate level in logistics of a public higher education 
institution participated in the study. A total of 58 students (29 pairs) participated in this 
experiment, being 13 pairs in the Control dealing, 8 pairs in the Relationship dealing 
and 8 pairs in the Status dealing. 
An experiment was carried out based on the methodology applied in the studies 
of Loch and Wu (2008), with the objective of identifying the behavior of the Brazilian 
decision makers represented here by the students of the upper level classes. 
The design of the experiment was 3x1 in which the three treatments (control, 
relationship and status) were manipulated by a student profile (graduate level). In the 
Loch and Wu (2008) experiment, the randomly selected participants played for 15 
rounds and made price decisions according to a demand function defined according 
to Equation 1. 
q=16-p                                                                                                       (1)   
Where: 
q = demanded quantity 
p = price 
The tools used for the experiment (procedures, descriptions, instructions) were 
similar to previous studies, so that the results could be compared. However, unlike the 
 
 
 
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/] 
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License 
 
1296 
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P) 
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 10, n. 4, Special Edition IFLOG 2018 
ISSN: 2236-269X 
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v10i4.988 
original work, this experiment was performed in a classroom, by hand, and no software 
was used in the application of the experiment. We used LibreOffice Calc only for the 
calculations of demand, participants' profits and graphics. 
In the application of the experiment, initially, the instructions of how the activity 
would be performed were informed to the students by the instructors. The students 
who participated in the control treatment were randomly divided, obeying the criteria 
of balancing gender and age for all treatments, and arranged in the classroom so that 
players A stayed in one extreme and players B in the other end of the room so that 
they could not discover the identity of their partner in the pair during the experiment. 
The game instructions were given to each participant, as well as a 20 rounds 
sheet block (so that the study participants did not know when the experiment would 
end) to player A of each pair, containing the round number, price of player A and price 
of player B, and also a result sheet to each participant, for individual control of results. 
Players A decided on their price of the product, the instructors picked up the 
sheets from that pairs' round, shuffled and then handed the sheets to their 
corresponding pair on the other side of the room, so they didn’t find the identity of the 
other player. After player B decides on the price, based on the price that player A 
decided, the sheets were collected, and then the instructors made the prices of each 
player available on the board, the demand of that product in the market and the profits 
of each player of that round, so that the students could write down in their result sheets. 
Then the next round started, subsequently ending in round 15. 
In the Status dealing, there was also no interaction of the pairs during the game, 
and the difference was the delivery of only one results sheet, who took turns between 
player A and player B of each pair during the game through the instructors, in addition 
to having the winner of each round announced on the board, in order to encourage 
competition between players. Already in the relationship dealing, before the beginning 
of the game, the doubles were introduced and shook hands, and it was emphasized 
that they (player A and player B) cared about each other. However, during the game, 
there was no interaction between the members, and each pair was assigned only a 
player’s results sheet as well.  
Hypothesis 1 of the theory raised by the studies of authors Loch and Wu (2008) 
predicts that decisions on player A and player B's price would be lower in Relationship 
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and higher in Status, relative to Control. If social preference conditions do not have an 
effect, the three conducts of the experiment should show results that resemble the 
theories of rationality and selfishness, where pA=8 and pB=4, during all periods. In 
hypothesis 2, player A's price decision increases with player B's price decision in the 
previous round (reciprocity), and player A's price decreases if his win in the previous 
round is higher (status). The same goes for Player B. 
4. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
As in the studies of Loch and Wu (2008), the impact of social preferences in the 
different treatments of this experiment was verified. Prices, decisions and evolution 
during the rounds were also checked. 
Table 1 shows the prices, profits and efficiency of the doubles in the three types 
of treatment.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics in 15 rounds 
Treatment Average Standard Median 
Control     
     Price of A 5,4974 2,9574            5 
     Price of B 5,7333 3,2413            5 
    Profit of A 21,2 15,5483 24 
     Profit of B 20,2872 14,8951 22 
     Efficiency 64,82%   
Relationship     
     Price of A 6,1083 3,5142 5 
     Price of B 5,2 3,3895 5 
     Profit of A 21,5583 14,8606 24 
     Profit of B 17,8583 13,5301 16 
     Efficiency 61,59%   
Status     
     Price of A 5,3750 2,8845 5 
     Price of B 5,4583 2,8606 5 
     Profit of A 21,3333 14,7108 20,5 
     Profit of B 21,9500 14,5035 23 
     Efficiency 67,63%   
Source: Authors (2018) 
The results indicate that different types of treatment are effective and change 
behavior in decision making, that is, people behave according to the environment in 
which they are. 
This study showed that profits in the treatment of Status were slightly higher 
than in the Control and Relationship treatment, unlike the study conducted by Loch 
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and Wu, where the profits were higher in the Relationship treatment and lower in the 
Treatment status, than in the Control treatment. 
Next, player A's average price decisions in the 15 rounds are shown in Figure 
1 along with the best responses (which would be the rational decision that would 
maximize the profit). 
 Graph 1: Price of player A for 15 rounds in the different treatments 
Source: Authors (2018) 
According to the revised theory, rational and selfish players should make the 
same price decision throughout the game, and this is not what happened in this study. 
An interesting fact is that even in the Control treatment, where the participants did not 
have any type of interaction, their decisions were lower than their best answer (Graph 
3), as well as the decisions of player A (Graph 1). 
It can also be noticed that the average decisions of the subjects do not change 
considerably over periods, which reinforces that the effects of the treatments remain 
stable throughout the game.  
Still in the analysis of Table 1, it can be noted that the prices of the Status 
treatment are lower than in the Control treatment, and higher in the Relationship 
Treatment. 
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 Graph 2: Price of player B and comparisons with the best price response 
Source: Authors (2018) 
Graph 3 shows that in the Control treatment, player B's price falls below the 
best rational response, contrary to the results of Loch and Wu (2008). 
 Graph 3: Price vs. Best Response in Control Treatment 
Source: Authors (2018) 
In the Status treatment, decisions of player B almost reach the best response 
(Graph 4), and in the experiment of Loch and Wu the response of player B is higher 
than the best answer. 
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Graph 4: Price vs. Best response in Status Treatment 
Source: Authors (2018) 
In the Relationship treatment, shown in Figure 5, player B's decisions fluctuate 
strongly around the best answer, unlike the work of Loch and Wu (2008), where 
decisions remained below the best answer. 
 Graph 5: Price vs. Best response in Relationship Treatment 
Source: Authors (2018) 
Graph 6 presents the accumulated frequencies of the price decisions of player 
A (Graph 2) and player B (Chart 3) over the 15 rounds, in the three conducts. It can 
be seen from the graph that the social preferences in the different treatments change 
the behavior of the decision-making subjects. 
In both graphics, the Control Treatment has its distribution on the left side, while 
the Status treatment has its distribution in the middle for player A, and to the right on 
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player B. Already in the Relationship treatment, in the decisions of player A, he 
remains on the right, and decisions of player B's stay in the middle. 
 
 Graph 6: Cumulative frequency of price decisions in all rounds 
Source: Authors (2018) 
Graph 7 shows the profit of players A and B respectively during the rounds. 
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 Graph 7: Profit of players A and B in the 15 rounds 
Source: Authors (2018) 
The efficiency achieved in the treatments shows that in Status an efficiency of 
67.63% was reached, in Control 64.82% and in Relationship efficiency was 61.59%. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Most of the studies on supply chain contracting converge in negotiations with 
rational subjects and disregard the impact of behavior in this type of scenario (LOCH, 
WU, 2008). The present study aimed to verify the effect of social preferences in 
decision making in negotiations in a supply chain. 
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According to the results of the experiment, it was verified that the subjects 
deviate from the quantity that maximizes the profit due to the effects of the social 
preferences. The greatest difference found was in the average player B's profit in the 
Status and Relationship treatments, where the average profit difference between 
these two conditions was 18.63%, affirming the best efficiency of the Status treatment 
in our study, with 67.63 %, unlike the work done by Loch and Wu (2008), where it was 
found that the Relationship treatment had the highest efficiency in relation to the other 
conditions. 
Loch and Wu (2008) reiterated the importance of social preferences, which can 
both encourage cooperative behavior between the parties, but also produce the 
opposite effect by undermining profits. They also affirmed that another study on this 
theme pointed to social preferences as being as or more effective than contracts. 
This study can be considered innovative in the national context, because it was 
the first to analyze social preferences in contracts and compare it with other work done 
abroad. 
As a limitation to the study, the fact that the participants are not completely 
foreign to each other is highlighted, although there was no contact during the 
experiment, they study in the same teaching institution; another limiting factor was the 
number of students recruited in the research, as well as the fact that the experiment 
was applied manually. 
Thus, as a suggestion for future research, it is recommended to replicate this 
study with a larger number of participants. 
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